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Abstract		 	
This	article	examines	the	intersections	of	violence,	governance,	identity	and	legitimacy	in	relation	to	
autodefensas	(self-defence	groups)	 in	Latin	America,	 focusing	on	Mexico	and	Colombia.	By	shifting	
focus	from	the	question	of	where	legitimacy	lies	to	how	it	is	produced	and	contested	by	a	range	of	
groups,	we	 challenge	 the	often	presumed	 link	 between	 the	 state	 and	 legitimacy.	We	develop	 the	
idea	of	a	 field	of	negotiation	and	contestation,	 firstly,	 to	discuss	and	critique	 the	concept	of	 state	
failure	as	not	merely	a	Western	hegemonic	claim	but	also	a	strategic	means	of	producing	legitimacy	
by	 autodefensas.	 Secondly,	 we	 employ	 and	 enrich	 the	 notion	 of	 violent	 pluralism	 to	 discuss	 the	
pervasiveness	of	violence	and	the	role	of	neoliberalism,	and	to	address	the	question	of	non-violent	
practices	of	governance.	We	argue	that	the	idea	of	a	field	of	contestation	and	negotiation	helps	to	
understand	the	complexity	of	relationships	that	encompass	the	production	of	legitimacy	and	identity	
through	 (non)violent	 governance,	 whereby	 lines	 between	 (non)state,	 (non)violence,	 and	
(il)legitimacy	 blur	 and	 transform.	 Yet,	 we	 do	 not	 simply	 dismiss	 (binary)	 distinctions	 as	 these	
continue	 to	 be	 employed	 by	 groups	 in	 their	 efforts	 to	 produce,	 justify,	 challenge,	 contest	 and	
negotiate	their	own	and	others’	legitimacy	and	identity.		
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1.	Introduction	
On	 24th	 February	 2013	 armed	 groups	 took	 control	 of	 the	 towns	 of	 Felipe	 Carrillo	 Puerto	
(known	 as	 ‘La	 Ruana’)	 and	 Tepalcatepec	 in	 the	 Tierra	 Caliente	 region	 of	 the	 Mexican	 state	 of	
Michoacán.	 Describing	 themselves	 as	 autodefensas	 (self-defence	 groups),	 they	 declared	 that	 they	
had	 risen	up	against	 the	 rule	of	 the	 local	 cartel,	 Los	Caballeros	 Templarios	 (The	Knights	 Templar).	
The	level	of	media	attention	that	these	groups	have	subsequently	garnered	in	their	struggle	against	
the	cartel	may	indicate	that	this	phenomenon	is	somehow	unique.	In	fact,	neither	the	occurrence	of	
self-defence	groups,	nor	their	deployment	of	the	term	‘autodefensa’	is	novel	in	Latin	America.	Such	
groups	have	emerged	periodically	in	the	region’s	history,	perhaps	the	most	famous	recent	example	
being	 those	 that	 emerged	 in	 Colombia	 in	 the	 early	 1980s.	 The	 term	 ‘autodefensa’,	 and	 its	
deployment	by	such	groups,	has	produced	debates	around	the	degree	of	difference	between	ideas	
of	 self-defence	 and	 paramilitarism,	 often	 focusing	 on	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 such	 groups	 are	
defensive/offensive	in	their	outlook	and	capabilities	(Romero	2003:	36-37).	Whilst	such	debates	are	
interesting,	this	article	is	not	concerned	with	adding	to	that	literature,	and	simply	acknowledges	and	
indeed	 demonstrates,	 that	 the	 term	 autodefensa	 is	 deployed	 by	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 groups	 whose	
composition	 and	 aims	 vary.	 Instead,	 the	 focus	 here	 is	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 violence,	
governance,	 legitimacy	and	 identity	 in	 the	context	of	autodefensas	 in	Colombia	and	Mexico.	More	
specifically,	 we	 ask	 how	 violence	 and	 governance	 are	 employed	 by	 the	 state,	 autodefensas	 and	
other	groups	to	construct	(legitimate)	identities.		
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Subsequent	to	their	emergence	in	February	2013,	the	autodefensas	of	Michoacán	went	on	
to	gain	control	over	much	of	 the	 territory	of	 the	state	of	Michoacán.	They	often	set	up	 their	own	
citizen	councils	to	take	over	the	government	of	the	towns	that	they	controlled,	and	disarmed	much	
of	 the	 local	 municipal	 police	 who	 they	 perceived	 as	 having	 been	 corrupted	 by	 the	 cartel.	 Their	
growing	 power	 eventually	 prompted	 a	 Federal	 response	 in	 January	 2014,	 and	 an	 agreement	was	
reached	 for	many	of	 the	autodefensas	 to	be	 subsumed	 into	a	Rural	Defence	Force,	armed	by	and	
under	 the	 aegis	 of	 the	 state.	 When	 the	 time	 came	 to	 demobilise	 in	 May	 2014,	 some	 of	 the	
autodefensas	refused	and	many	of	 their	members	were	subsequently	 jailed,	whilst	others	became	
part	of	the	Rural	Defence	Force,	some	of	which	later	were	institutionalised	into	the	Michoacán	State	
police.		
The	autodefensas	in	Colombia	emerged	in	the	early	to	mid-1980s	initially	in	the	Magdalena	
Medio	 region	of	 central	 Colombia.	 They	were	 a	 direct	 response	 to	 the	 actions	of	 the	 guerrillas	 of	
FARC	 (Fuerzas	 Armadas	 Revolucionarias	 de	 Colombia).	 Despite	 the	 autodefensas	 being	 declared	
illegal	 in	1989,	 they	continued	to	grow	 in	 line	with	the	expansion	of	 the	guerrilla	movements,	and	
also	 spread	 to	 other	 regions	 of	 Colombia	 (Avilés	 2006:	 380).	 In	 1997,	 disparate	 groups	 of	
autodefensas	and	paramilitaries	came	together	to	form	the	Autodefensas	Unidas	de	Colombia	(AUC)	
which	was	an	explicitly	nationwide	umbrella	organisation	that	sought	to	co-ordinate	and	further	the	
aims	 of	 the	 groups	which	 formed	 its	membership	 (Romero	 2003:	 151-152).	 The	 AUC	went	 on	 to	
become	 a	 major	 violent	 actor	 within	 Colombia,	 controlling	 municipalities,	 fighting	 against	 the	
guerrillas	 of	 FARC	 and	 the	 ELN	 (Ejército	 de	 Liberación	 Nacional),	 and	 conducting	 social	 cleansing	
operations	 against	 suspected	 guerrilla	 sympathisers	 within	 the	 civilian	 population.	 The	 AUC	
eventually	demobilised,	from	2004	to	2006,	after	the	election	of	Alvaro	Uribe	as	President	 in	2002	
signalled	a	major	military	crackdown	against	the	guerrilla	forces.	Whilst	many	of	the	groups	that	had	
formed	the	AUC	demobilised,	others	continued	as	before	and	were	henceforth	described	as	criminal	
groups	(Inkster	and	Comolli	2012:	65).		
We	examine	the	autodefensas	in	Mexico	and	Colombia	to	make	sense	of	the	production	of	
legitimacy	 and	 identity	 through	 violent	 governance.	Our	 aim	 is	 therefore	not	 to	 compare	 the	 two	
cases	or	to	argue	they	are	the	same	or	arise	from	similar	contexts,	as	Mexico	and	Colombia	clearly	
have	their	own	histories	and	socio-political	settings.	Rather,	we	employ	these	cases	to	ask	broader	
questions	 about	 violence,	 governance,	 legitimacy	 and	 identity,	 and	 the	 blurring	 of	 lines	 between	
state	 and	 non-state,	 violence	 and	 non-violence,	 legitimate	 and	 illegitimate.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	
article	explores	the	ways	in	which	autodefensas	employ	violence	to	establish	governance	networks,	
interact	 with	 other	 groups	 and	 seek	 to	 produce	 legitimate	 identities.	 In	 this	 context,	 governance	
refers	to	processes	of	ordering	and	regulating	things,	people	and	relations	that	can	be	undertaken	by	
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a	range	of	groups	(not	necessarily	related	to	the	state);	that	might	have	disordering	effects;	and,	that	
involve	processes	of	both	negotiation	and	contestation.		
By	shifting	 focus	 from	the	question	of	where	 legitimacy	 lies	 to	how	 it	 is	produced	through	
violence	 by	 different	 groups,	 we	 suggest	 that	 autodefensas	 challenge	 the	 often	 presumed	 link	
between	 the	 state	 and	 legitimacy,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 (binary)	 distinction	 between	 legitimacy	 and	
violence.	We	contextualise	this	question	through	an	engagement	with	and	critique	of	two	notions:	
state	failure	and	violent	pluralism	(Arias	and	Goldstein	2010).	We	argue	that	engaging	autodefensas	
in	 Mexico	 and	 Colombia	 through	 the	 question	 of	 violence,	 governance,	 identity	 and	 legitimacy	
highlights	several	aspects	that	state	failure	literature	mostly	fails	to	address,	and	which	the	notion	of	
violent	 pluralism	 can	 help	 to	 examine.	 We	 develop	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 field	 of	 contestation	 and	
negotiation,	 firstly,	 to	 show	that	 state	 failure	 is	not	merely	a	Western	hegemonic	claim	but	also	a	
tool	employed	by	autodefensas	in	their	efforts	to	legitimatise	violent	governance.	Secondly,	the	idea	
of	 a	 field	 of	 contestation	 and	 negotiation	 serves	 to	 enrich	 the	 notion	 of	 violent	 pluralism	 by	
addressing	the	intricacy	of	violence	and	non-violence	in	these	practices	of	governance.			
Thus,	we	employ	 the	concept	of	 state	 failure	not	only	because	both	Colombia	and	Mexico	
have	been	subject	to	both	state	failure	 literature	and	its	critiques	but	also,	and	more	interestingly,	
because	the	 leaders	of	autodefensas	themselves	have	employed	the	discourse	of	state	failure.	We	
are	 interested	 in	 how	 state	 failure	 operates	 as	 part	 of	 a	 field	 of	 contestation	 and	 negotiation	
productive	of	different	claims	to	identity	and	legitimacy.	The	autodefensas’	 instrumental	utilisation	
of	 state	 failure	discourse	means	 it	becomes	a	 strategic	means	of	making	a	 claim	 to,	or	producing,	
legitimacy	through	violence	by	various	groups.	This	means	that	the	relationship	between	the	state,	
autodefensas	and	other	groups	is	one	of	opposition,	tension	and	co-constitution	simultaneously.	To	
make	 sense	 of	 this	 complex	 field	 of	 relations,	 we	 employ	 the	 notion	 of	 violent	 pluralism,	 which	
offers	a	conception	of	politics	as	violent	struggle	constitutive	of	political	(dis)ordering	and	identity	in	
the	Latin	American	context.	In	addition,	we	enrich	this	notion	with	the	idea	of	a	field	of	contestation	
and	negotiation	in	order	to	make	sense	of	non-violent	practices	and	to	highlight	the	inextricability	of	
violence	and	non-violence.	We	argue	that,	in	the	context	of	autodefensas	in	Latin	America,	the	idea	
of	a	 field	of	contestation	and	negotiation	helps	 to	understand	the	complexity	of	 relationships	 that	
encompass	 the	 production	 of	 legitimacy	 and	 identity	 through	 (non)violent	 governance,	 whereby	
lines	between	(non)state,	(non)violence,	and	(il)legitimacy	blur	and	transform.	Yet,	we	do	not	simply	
dismiss	 (binary)	 distinctions	 as	 these	 continue	 to	 be	 employed	 by	 groups	 in	 their	 discursive	 and	
material	 efforts	 to	 produce,	 justify,	 challenge,	 contest	 and	 negotiate	 their	 own	 and	 others’	
legitimacy	and	identity.		
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2.	State	Failure:	Institutions,	relations	and	the	production	of	knowledge		
In	2010,	then	US	Secretary	of	State	Hillary	Clinton	commented	that	Mexico	is	‘looking	more	
and	more	like	Colombia	20	years	ago’	(BBC	2010;	see	also:	Morton	2011).	Her	comments	resonate	
with	 a	 frequently	 asked	 question	 among	 scholars	 and	 commentators:	 Will	 Mexico	 ‘become	
Colombia’	 of	 the	 1990s	with	 respect	 to	 the	 proliferation	 of	 non-state	 armed	 groups	 and	 the	 high	
incidence	of	violence,	and	in	doing	so	exhibit	characteristics	of	a	failed	state	(e.g.	Escalante	Gonzalbo	
2009:	 84-96;	 Pansters	 2012:	 6)?	 This	 perceived	 risk	 of	 state	 failure	 seems	 to	 be	 supported	 by	
Colombia	and	Mexico’s	listing	in	the	‘elevated	warning’	category	of	the	Fragile	State	Index,	ranking	
69th	and	88th	respectively	(out	of	188	countries)1.	The	Index,	a	collaboration	between	Foreign	Policy	
and	 The	 Fund	 for	 Peace,	 ranks	 countries	 based	 on	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 (sub-)indicators	 –	 including	
‘corruption’,	 ‘internal	 conflict’,	 ‘protests	 and	 demonstrations’,	 ‘youth	 unemployment’,	
‘powerlessness’,	‘internet	access’,	‘sanctions’	–	whereby	the	link	to	state	‘failure’	or	‘fragility’	is	not	
necessarily	self-evident.		
These	 rankings	 and	 concerns	 reflect,	we	 argue,	 a	 particular	 conception	 and	 production	 of	
state	legitimacy	and	identity	more	than	objective	strength/fragility.	This	becomes	clear	by	mapping	
the	development	of	the	concept	of	‘failed	state’.	The	notion	first	appeared	in	a	1992	Foreign	Policy	
article,	 in	 which	 Gerald	 Helman	 and	 Steven	 Ratner	 argued	 that	 ‘From	 Haiti	 in	 the	 Western	
Hemisphere	to	the	remnants	of	Yugoslavia	in	Europe,	from	Somalia,	Sudan,	and	Liberia	in	Africa	to	
Cambodia	 in	 Southeast	 Asia,	 a	 disturbing	 new	 phenomenon	 is	 emerging:	 the	 failed	 nation-state,	
utterly	incapable	of	sustaining	itself	as	a	member	of	the	international	community.’	The	roots	of	the	
problem,	they	note,	lie	in	the	‘vast	proliferation	of	nation-states’	due	to	decolonisation	in	the	post-
WWII	 period.	 At	 this	 time,	 the	 right	 to	 self-determination	 took	 precedence	 over	 ‘long-term	
survivability’.	The	problem	of	the	failed	state	did	not,	however,	surface	during	the	Cold	War	as	states	
were	 propped	 up	 through	 ‘hefty	 infusions	 of	 aid’	 (Ibid.)	 from	 former	 colonial	 masters	 and	
superpowers	due	to	their	strategic	importance.		
Of	 interest	 in	 their	 analysis	 is,	 firstly,	 the	 connection	of	 very	diverse	 types	of	 states	 into	a	
single	‘problem’	(Call	2008:	1494).	Later	state	failure	scholars	are	equally	guilty	of	this,	e.g.	William	
Zartman’s	 Collapsed	 States,	 which	 defines	 ‘collapsed’	 (1995:	 5)	 as	 the	 non-performance	 of	 basic	
state	functions,	aggregating	a	diversity	of	states	and	phenomena.	Secondly,	they	ascribe	a	catalysing	
effect	 to	 the	end	of	 the	Cold	War	–	another	 interpretation	 is	 that	 it	was	more	a	 case	of	a	 shift	 in	
scholarly	attention	from	superpower	rivalry	towards	internal	conflicts	and	crises.	Thirdly,	and	equally	
significant,	is	the	break	established	between	the	colonial	and	post-colonial	periods,	thus	cutting	off	
the	 functioning	 and	 effects	 of	 colonisation	 from	 the	 frame	 of	 analysis	 (cf.	 Call	 2008:	 1499-1500;	
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Pureza	et	al	2006:1).	Hence,	it	becomes	possible	to	argue	that	states	that	gained	independence	after	
1945	 attach	 too	much	 importance	 to	 sovereignty,	whereas	 (humanitarian)	 intervention,	would	 be	
the	best	–	read:	most	cost-effective	–	solution	to	the	problem	of	 failed	states	(Helman	and	Ratner	
1992).	
The	 notion	 of	 failed	 states	 attracted	 relatively	 little	 scholarly	 interest	 during	much	 of	 the	
1990s,	although	it	did	become	a	concern	for	policy	makers,	as	demonstrated	by	the	US	intervention	
in	Somalia,	seen	by	many	scholars	as	 the	collapsed	state	par	excellence	 (e.g.	Call	2008:	1492;	Gros	
1996:	 464;	 Pham	 2009:	 84;	 Rotberg	 2002).	 The	 subsequent	 development	 of	 the	 notion	 and	 its	
broadening	to	include	a	range	of	situations	from	‘fragility’	to	‘collapse’	(e.g.	Acemoglu	and	Robinson	
2012:	8-9,	398,	429;	Chesterman,	 Ignatieff	and	Thakur	2005:	8;	Etsy	et	al	1998;	Grayson	2010:	3-4;	
Helman	and	Ratner	1992),	continued	to	rely	on	vague	definitions	and	arbitrary	aggregations.	A	shift	
occurred	towards	the	end	of	the	1990s,	when	international	financial	institutions	became	increasingly	
interested	in	questions	of	governance	and	state-building	–	their	Cold	War	‘neutrality’	had	prevented	
broaching	such	issues	–	thus	forging	a	link	between	governance	and	development	(Call	2008:	1493).	
Another	 decisive	 shift	 occurred	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 11	 September	 2001	 attacks,	 when	 failed	
states	became	cast	as	safe	havens	for	terrorists	and	launchpads	for	terrorism,	which	could	have	dire	
consequences	both	regionally	and	globally	(e.g.	Crocker	2003;	Fukuyama	2004;	Hamre	and	Sullivan	
2002;	 Litwak	2007:	43;	Rotberg	2002;	 Siegle	et	 al	 2004	–	 for	 critiques,	 see:	Hehir	2007;	Manjikian	
2008).	The	Failed	States	Index	emerges	in	this	context,	first	published	in	2005	and	renamed	Fragile	
State	Index	in	2014.		
The	 perceived	 risk	 of	 Mexico	 and	 Colombia	 being	 or	 becoming	 failed	 or	 fragile	 states	 is	
therefore	 the	 result	 of	 a	 particular	 conception	 of	 how	 a	 modern	 state	 should	 operate	 and	 what	
makes	 it	 ‘strong’,	 ‘developed’,	 ‘legitimate’,	etc.	 In	 this	context,	 the	ascription	of	 failed	state	status	
can	be	seen	as	a	Western	hegemonic	claim	that	enables	intervention.	Such	claims	rely	on	the	logic	of	
modernisation	and	a	particular	linking	of	development	and	governance,	whereby	both	Colombia	and	
Mexico	are	regarded	as	cases	of	under-	or	regressive	development.	As	Adam	Morton	(2012:	1634)	
points	 out,	 traditional	 understandings	 of	 Colombia	 in	 the	 failed	 state	 literature	 suggest	 that	 the	
country	 fails	 to	 measure	 up	 to	 an	 ideal-type	 conception	 of	 the	 modern	 state.	 Failed	 states	 are	
represented	 in	 pathological	 terms	 of	 ‘deviance,	 aberration	 and	 breakdown’.	 Scholars	 such	 as	
Fukuyama,	Huntington	and	Kaplan	paint	a	picture	of	the	postcolonial	world	reminiscent	of	The	Heart	
of	Darkness,	as	a	place	of	‘danger	and	darkness,	anarchy	and	disorder’	(Ibid:	1635).	Such	conceptions	
became	 expressed	 amongst	 policy	makers,	 especially	 in	 the	US,	 as	 a	 fear	 that	 a	 historically	weak	
state	such	as	Colombia,	plagued	by	internal	violence,	would	descend	into	a	failed	state	(Ibid:	1634).	
Moreover,	it	paved	the	way	for	US	intervention	in	the	form	of	a	joint	Colombia-US	initiative	known	
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as	Plan	Colombia,	which	began	in	2001	and	lasted	until	2006	(though	other	aid/assistance	packages	
remain	in	place)2.		
This	‘pathological’	thinking	has	also	informed	US	policymaking	towards	Mexico:	for	instance,	
the	2008	US	Joint	Forces	Command	paper	outlines	the	dangers	of	Mexico	failing	due	to	the	upsurge	
of	 violence	 in	 the	 context	of	 the	war	on	drugs.	Moreover,	 fearing	 that	 such	problems	will	 spread,	
Mexico,	a	neighbouring	country,	 is	conceived	as	a	security	 threat	 to	 the	USA	 (Ibid.:	1635;	US	 Joint	
Forces	 Command	 2008:	 36;	 see	 also:	 US	 Joint	 Forces	 Command	 2010:	 47).	 Whilst	 the	 Mexican	
government	rejected	the	need	for	a	‘Plan	Mexico’,	and	academics	such	as	Morton	(2012:	1635)	have	
described	 the	portrayal	 of	Mexico	 as	 a	 failed	 state	 as	 a	 caricature	 and	 a	misunderstanding	of	 the	
social	and	economic	factors	at	play,	it	is	clear	that	the	notion	of	‘failed’	or	‘failing’	state	has	had	far-
reaching	discursive	and	material	effects	in	both	Mexico	and	Colombia.			
Morton	offers	an	important	critique	of	the	failed	state	literature	as	well	as	the	ascription	of	
failed	state	status	to	Mexico	and	Colombia,	however,	his	is	certainly	not	the	only	criticism	levelled	at	
this	 body	 of	 scholarship.	 Failed	 state	 literature	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 sustained	 critiques	 over	 a	
number	 of	 years.	 These	 critiques	 can	 be	 roughly	 divided	 into	 ‘soft’	 critiques,	 which	 point	 to	 the	
socially	 constructed	 and	 therefore	 changing	 character	 of	 institutions	 and	 identities,	 but	 which	
ultimately	seek	to	save	the	concept	by	improving	it	(e.g.	Frödin	2012:	278;	Romero	2000:	53-54),	and	
more	profound	critiques	which	question	the	discourse	of	‘failed’,	‘collapsed’,	‘fragile’,	etc.	states	as	
such.	These	latter	critiques	challenge	the	binary	distinctions	the	softer	critiques	ultimately	rely	upon	
–	legitimate	vs	illegitimate;	civil	vs	uncivil;	rule	of	law	vs	unrule	of	law	(e.g.	see:	Koonings	and	Kruijt	
2004:	1-2;	Kruijt	2011).		
These	 scholars	 argue	 that,	 not	 only	 is	 there	 no	 accepted	 definition	 of	 what	 a	 ‘failed’	 or	
‘weak’	state	is,	grouping	together	a	wide	variety	of	states,	contexts	and	situations	(Call	2008:	1942;	
Hehir	2007:	212-213),	the	concept	of	state	failure	is	an	effect	of	particular	relations	of	power,	and	of	
the	production	of	knowledge.	The	question	is	therefore	not	whether	or	not,	or	to	what	extent,	states	
are	failing	but	rather	how	states	come	to	be	seen	as	failing;	on	what	basis	and	according	to	which,	
and	whose,	criteria	(e.g.	see:	Pureza	et	al	2006:	2).	Here	we	come	back	to	Morton’s	point	regarding	
‘pathologisation’,	whereby	the	Western	production	of	a	particular	idea	of	the	liberal	state,	regarded	
as	universally	valid,	 is	set	against	 the	 ‘Third	World	State’.	The	effect	 is	a	conception	of	democratic	
states	as	strong	and	 legitimate	versus	weak	or	 failing	states,	characterised	by	sickness,	 illegitimacy	
and	 violence	 (Bilgin	 and	 Morton	 2002;	 Morton	 2012:	 1634;	 Morton	 2005:	 377),	 and	 in	 need	 of	
intervention.	States	with	‘objectionable	features’	are	thus	too	readily	conflated	with	those	that	are	
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in	crisis	as	is	the	case	in	Colombia,	which	has	been	marked	as	failing	despite	its	record	of	relatively	
stable	state	institutions	over	several	decades	(Call	2008:	1500).		
These	critiques	usefully	 illustrate	how	the	ascription	of	 failed	state	status	to	Colombia	and	
Mexico	involves	the	production	of	a	particular	(Western)	conception	of	state	development,	identity	
and	legitimacy.	Yet,	in	the	context	of	autodefensas,	the	idea	of	state	failure	functions	not	only	as	a	
Western	imposition	but	also,	we	argue,	as	a	strategic	tool	employed	by	non-state	groups	seeking	to	
legitimise	 their	 (violent)	governance.	For	 instance,	Dr	Mireles,	a	key	autodefensa	 leader	 in	Mexico	
claimed	 that;	 ‘the	 state	 has	 offices	 here	 but	 the	 power	 of	 the	 state	 doesn’t	 exist	 here’3	 (our	
translation	 throughout	 unless	 otherwise	 stated;	 see	 also:	 De	 Llano	 2013;	 Martínez	 2013:	 12).	 In	
other	 statements	he	has	 taken	 this	 rhetoric	 further	by	declaring	 that	 the	state	was	 in	 league	with	
organised	 crime:	 ‘No	 institution	 could	 fulfil	 its	 duties	 because	 all	 the	 authorities	 –	 from	 the	
municipal,	to	the	State	and	Federal	levels	–	were	part	of	the	cartels,	or	were	being	paid	off	by	these	
cartels’4.	 Another	 important	 autodefensa	 leader,	 Hipólito	 Mora,	 deploring	 the	 failure	 of	 local	
government,	 called	 directly	 to	 the	 state	 and	 the	 federal	 government,	 saying:	 ‘We	 have	 been	
abandoned	by	the	state	as	if	we	didn’t	exist….we	ask	President	Peña	Nieto	for	a	little	attention,	not	
much,	just	a	little’	(Prados	2013).	
Thus,	 from	 the	 start	 of	 the	mobilisations,	 the	 language	 of	 state	 failure	 was	 an	 important	
instrument	 for	 the	 autodefensas	 to	 claim	 the	 absence	 and/or	 corrupted	 character	 of	 the	 state,	
thereby	 legitimising	 the	 formation	 of	 armed	 groups	 by	 citizens,	 who	 were	 forced	 to	 take	
responsibility	 for	 their	 security	 into	 their	 own	 hands.	 By	 calling	 themselves	 ‘autodefensas’,	 they	
made	clear	 their	non-state	 identity	–	 i.e.	not	 failing	–	whilst	 constructing	an	 identity	 that	was	not	
directly	threatening	to	the	state,	and	defensive	in	nature.	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	claim	of	
state	failure	was	also	aimed	at	provoking	a	response	that	would	embarrass	the	state	into	action	on	
their	 behalf.	 As	 we	 will	 go	 on	 to	 discuss,	 rather	 than	 simply	 an	 expression	 of	 state	 failure,	 the	
autodefensas	can	be	seen	as	pursuing	a	politics	of	labelling	by	employing	the	notion	of	state	failure	
to	delegitimise	the	state	and	construct	their	own	identity	and	legitimacy.	
Such	 labelling	 of	 the	 state	 as	 failed	 continued	 after	 the	 Federal	 state	 intervened	 in	
Michoacán	 in	 2014	 and	 attempted	 to	 institutionalise	 some	 of	 the	 autodefensas	 into	 the	 state	
security	 corps.	 Indeed,	 the	 autodefensa	 group	 of	 San	Miguel	 de	 Aquila	 saw	 this	 very	 strategy	 as	
evidence	 that	Michoacán	was	a	 failed	 state:	 ‘In	 the	 recent	declarations	of	President	Enrique	Peña	
Nieto	 he	 is	 recognising	 that	 Michoacán	 is	 a	 failed	 state	 by	 proposing	 the	 integration	 of	 the	
autodefensas	into	the	security	forces	of	the	State,	something	that	we	think	doesn’t	resolve	the	root	
causes	 of	 the	 problem’	 (Sin	 Embargo	 2014).	 And	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 this	 strategy	 such	 rhetoric	
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continued	to	be	used	to	counter	the	idea	that	 it	had	brought	security	to	the	region:	 ‘It’s	a	farce	to	
say	the	Federal	Government	has	brought	peace	to	Michoacán.	We	continue	to	live	in	a	failed	state,	
in	a	state	where	there	isn’t	security,	where	there	is	no	imparting	of	justice’	(spokesman	for	‘Por	un	
Coalcomán	Libre	de	CT	SDR’	statement5).		
These	 pronouncements,	 and	 the	 very	 presence	 of	 autodefensas,	 fed	 into	 a	 wider	 debate	
around	 the	question	of	whether	Michoacán	could	be	categorised	as	a	 failed	 state,	which	 included	
the	 church,	 politicians,	 civil	 society	 organisations,	 journalists	 and	 academics	 (e.g.	 Becerra-Acosta	
2013;	Beltrán	and	Cruz	2013;	Seguridad,	Justicia	y	Paz	2013;	Camacho	and	Jiménez	2014;	Castellanos	
2013;	López-Dóriga	2015;	Rosen	and	Zepeda	2016:	84-85).	Through	their	utilisation	of	the	term	and	
indeed	their	very	presence,	 the	autodefensas	generated	an	 intense	debate	around	the	nature	and	
classification	 of	 the	 term	 ‘failed	 state’	 as	 a	 means	 not	 only	 of	 denouncing	 the	 state	 but	 also	 of	
legitimating	alternative	forms	of	(violent)	governance,	which	we	will	discuss	in	more	detail	next.			
	
3.	Legitimising	Violent	Governance		
The	idea	that	state	failure	is	not	merely	a	violent	imposition	of	Western	modernity	but	also	a	
legitimating	 claim	 for	 (violent)	 governance	 on	 behalf	 of	 local	 non-state	 groups	 in	 a	wider	 field	 of	
contestation	can	be	better	understood	through	an	engagement	with	the	notion	of	violent	pluralism	
developed	by	Arias	and	Goldstein	 in	 their	book	Violent	Democracies	 in	Latin	America	 (2010).	They	
coin	 the	 term	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 persistence,	 and	 intricate	 entwinement,	 of	 violence	 and	
democracy	in	Latin	America.	Violence,	rather	than	being	an	outlier	or	representing	a	failure	to	live	up	
to	the	standards	of	(a	dominant	Western	notion	of)	democracy,	is	a	key	component	of	how	state	and	
society	 as	 a	 whole	 function	 in	 this	 region.	 Seeking	 to	 understand	 how	 violence	 operates	without	
blaming	it	on	an	illiberal	state,	they	argue	that	violence	is	not	only	crucial	to	the	establishment	and	
maintenance	of	democratic	governance	but	also	to	popular	challenges	to	the	legitimacy	of	these.		
In	the	context	of	this	article,	the	significance	of	the	notion	of	violent	pluralism	lies,	firstly,	in	
drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 wider	 context	 of	 social	 and	 political	 relations	 of	 violence,	 rather	 than	
focusing	on	state-society	relations	only.	Secondly,	it	is	grounded	in	a	conceptualisation	of	politics	in	
terms	 of	 struggle	 and	 conflict	 productive	 of	 political	 ordering	 and	 subjectivity	 (Ibid:	 19,	 23).	 This	
enables	 a	 conceptualisation	 of	 relations	 –	 e.g.	 state/non-state;	 legitimacy/illegitimacy;	
governance/resistance	 –	 beyond	 binary	 terms,	 whilst	 acknowledging	 the	 important	 material	 and	
discursive	power	that	such	binaries	continue	to	have.	 It	helps	develop	the	 idea	of	governance	as	a	
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field	of	contestation	and	negotiation	produced	by	and	productive	of	competing	claims	to	legitimacy	
and	identity	by	a	range	of	state	and	non-state	groups,	whereby	the	delineation	between	these	blurs.		
Legitimacy	 is	 thus	 contested	 both	 as	 concept	 and	 in	 practice.	 Conceptually,	 the	 notion	 of	
violent	pluralism	offers	a	critique	of	approaches	that	identify	legitimacy	with	the	state,	whereby	it	is	
understood	as	the	extent	to	which	state	rule	 is	accepted	by	 its	people	without	recourse	to	fear	or	
favour	to	encourage	endorsement	(e.g.	Gilley	2006).	Bourdieu	challenges	this	Weberian	conception	
of	 the	 state’s	 legitimacy	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 a	 ‘free	 act	 of	 clear	 conscience’,	 arguing	 instead	 that	
legitimacy	 is	conditioned	by	structures	that	 foster	a	 ‘pre-reflexive	agreement’	with	the	established	
order	 (Bourdieu	 et	 al.	 1994).	 That	 is,	 rule	 is	 often	 not	 actively	 but	 tacitly	 accepted;	 structures	
become	normalised.	As	such,	questions	of	legitimacy	only	arise	during	times	of	crisis;	under	normal	
circumstances	 state	 legitimacy	 goes	 unquestioned.	 In	 distinction,	 the	 notion	 of	 violent	 pluralism	
brings	to	light	the	‘normality’	of	the	contestation	of	legitimacy	and	the	centrality	of	violence	to	the	
everyday	 functioning	 of	 governance	 regimes	 in	 the	 Latin	 American	 context,	 and	 especially	 with	
respect	to	autodefensas.	Legitimacy	is	accordingly	no	longer	automatically	identified	with	the	state	
and	 with	 legality;	 it	 is	 a	 continuous	 process	 of	 contestation	 involving	 discursive	 and	 material	
practices	by	a	range	of	groups	(cf	Dowling	and	Pfeffer	1975).	These	competing	efforts	to	create	and	
gain	recognition	for	alternative	forms	of	governance	are	productive	of	social	change	insofar	as	new	
forms	of	legitimacy	and	political	subjectivities	are	created	in	the	process.		
In	his	study	of	the	Knights	Templar	cartel	in	Michoacán,	Falko	Ernst	(2015)	employs	a	similar	
conception	 of	 legitimacy,	 as	 a	 process	 of	 competition	 among	 groups,	 whereby	 the	 state	 of	
Michoacán	 is	described	 in	terms	of	 ‘fractured	sovereignty’.	 In	 its	efforts	to	produce	 legitimacy,	the	
cartel	 portrayed	 itself	 as	 a	 local	 group	 protecting	 the	 people	 of	Michoacán	 from	 ‘foreign	 cartels’.	
They	 cultivated	a	quasi-religious	 identity	 and	presented	 the	 cartel	 as	 an	alternative	 justice	 system	
that	 represented	 ‘the	 government’	 in	 the	 areas	 that	 they	 controlled	 (Ernst	 2015:	 141;	 Gil	 Olmos	
2015).	 Central	 to	 this	 was	 the	 ability	 to	 utilise	 violence	 to	 repel	 competing	 cartels	 as	 was	 the	
construction	of	the	federal	government	as	an	outside	aggressor.	This	built	upon	feelings	of	insecurity	
in	populations	such	as	in	the	Tierra	Caliente	region,	in	which	the	state	was	seen	as	corrupt	and	as	the	
perpetrator	of	violence	against	local	populations,	whilst	these	people	felt	stigmatised	as	criminals	by	
the	Federal	government	(Ernst	2013,	2015;	Gledhill	2015).		
By	 setting	 themselves	 up	 as	 an	 alternative	 form	 of	 governance,	 the	 cartel	 challenged	 the	
state’s	identity	as	the	legitimate	source	of	law	and	order,	and	through	their	co-optation	of	parts	of	
the	local	state	helped	to	blur	the	line	between	state	and	non-state.	This	took	the	form	of	ensuring	
politicians	amenable	to	their	cause	were	elected	into	office,	using	bribery	and	threats	of	violence	to	
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ensure	impunity	for	their	actions,	and	using	state	institutions	such	as	the	municipal	police	as	a	tool	
for	their	interests.	Therefore,	whilst	they	would	at	times	openly	confront	parts	of	the	Federal	state,	
such	as	the	Federal	Police,	they	were	integrated	into	the	local	governance	and	law	enforcement	of	
other	 parts	 of	 the	 local	 and	 regional	 state.	 Allegations	 of	 co-operation	 or	 at	 least	 mutual	 non-
aggression	pacts,	are	also	alleged	to	have	been	made	between	the	cartel	and	the	army	–	which	 is	
part	of	the	Federal	state	–	in	the	region	(Ernst	2013;	Grillo	2016).		
In	line	with	the	idea	of	violent	pluralism,	Ernst’s	study	shows	that	legitimacy	is	a	process	or	
field	of	contestation	and	negotiation	whereby	violence	 is	employed	both	to	create	and	undermine	
the	 acceptance	 and	 recognition	 of	 different	 groups.	 Similarly,	 the	 autodefensas	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
response	 to	 the	 cartel’s	 regime	 of	 violent	 governance.	 The	 autodefensas	 positioned	 themselves	
against	the	violence	and	extortion	of	the	cartel	vis-à-vis	the	local	population	–	although,	importantly	
they	did	not	present	 themselves	as	anti-drugs	per	se	 (an	 important	source	of	 revenue	for	many	 in	
the	 region).	 The	 autodefensas’	 efforts	 at	 seeking	 legitimacy	 mirrored	 the	 strategies	 of	 the	 cartel	
insofar	as	violence	was	key	to	the	contestation	and	establishment	of	a	rival	regime	of	governance.	
The	autodefensas’	ability	to	defend	the	communities	in	which	they	were	based	was	central	to	their	
appeal	and	crucial	to	the	construction	of	their	identity.	Being	armed	and	organised	enabled	them	to	
take	over	the	functions	of	the	municipal	police	in	towns	where	they	were	in	league	with	the	cartel	
(Martínez	 et	 al	 2013).	 The	 establishement	 of	 a	 regime	 of	 violent	 governance,	 and	 the	 ability	 to	
survive	 the	assaults	of	 the	cartel,	was	central	 to	 their	appeal	 to,	and	ability	 to	negotiate	with,	 the	
regional	and	federal	governments.		
The	idea	that	the	production	of	legitimacy	is	part	of	a	field	of	contestation	and	negotiation	
suggests,	 in	 addition,	 that	 state/non-state	 relations	 are	 complex	 and	 changing	 rather	 than	 a	 fixed	
binary	 distinction,	 as	 is	 illustrated	by	 the	 autodefensas’	 deployment	 of	 discourses	 of	 state	 failure.	
Autodefensas	extensively	employed	these	discourses	to	reflect	their	perceptions	of	the	way	in	which	
the	cartel	had	influenced	the	local	and	regional	state.	In	doing	so	they	built	upon	existing	feelings	in	
the	region	that	the	cartel	had	tapped	into,	but	were	far	more	explicit	in	their	rhetoric,	claiming	that	
they	 had	 no	 alternative	 but	 to	 take	 things	 into	 their	 own	 hands.	 However,	 unlike	 the	 cartel	 their	
criticisms	did	not	extend	to	the	Federal	state,	whom	they	called	on	to	intervene	and	re-establish	the	
rule	of	 law	 in	 the	region	 (e.g.	Prados	2013).	Therefore,	despite	 their	 rhetoric	of	state	absence	and	
failure	they	recognised	that	the	Federal	state	was	still	an	 important	actor.	Autodefensas	thus	both	
appealed	 to	 the	state	as	a	 legitimate	actor	 to	 resolve	 their	problems,	and	sought	 to	challenge	 the	
state’s	legitimacy	by	exercising	control	over	territory	in	Michoacán	based	on	their	ability	to	project	
violence	and	protect	the	local	citizenry	from	the	Knights	Templar	cartel.		
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The	 autodefensas	 became	 de	 facto	 governing	 entities,	 both	 challenging	 and	 appealing	 to	
different	parts	of	the	state,	whilst	the	state	simultaneously	did	and	did	not	recognise	and	legitimise	
the	 autodefensas.	 One	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 state	 engaged	 in	 prolonged	 negotiations	 with	 the	
autodefensas,	 the	 Federal	 Police	 and	 army	undertook	operations	 alongside	 them,	 and,	 ultimately,	
the	 state	 sought	 to	 institutionalise	 the	autodefensas.	 Yet,	 on	 the	other	hand,	 and	 simultaneously,	
autodefensas	 were	 being	 portrayed	 as	 having	 connections	 with	 organised	 crime,	 attempts	 were	
made	to	disarm	them,	and	those	groups	who	refused	 institutionalisation	were	arrested	and	 jailed.	
This	 complex	 relationship	 between	 autodefensa	 groups	 and	 various	 state	 institutions	 –	 often	
blurring	the	lines	between	the	two	–	illustrates	the	play	of	legitimisation	and	de-legitimisation	in	the	
(co)construction	of	governance	regimes.		
	 Similarly	 in	 Colombia,	 the	 appeal	 of	 discourses	 of	 state	 failure	 was	 central	 to	 the	
autodefensa	groups’	legitimation	of	violent	governance.	This	was	true	during	their	initial	emergence	
in	 the	 Magdalena	 Medio	 region	 in	 the	 early	 1980s	 where	 they	 justified	 their	 mobilisation	 with	
reference	 to	 the	 state’s	 inability	 or	 unwillingness	 to	 protect	 the	 population	 from	 the	 guerrillas	
(Medina	 Gallego	 1990:	 178;	 Romero	 2003:	 38-39;	 Mazzei	 2009:	 81).	 It	 was	 subsequently	 made	
explicit	 under	 Carlos	 Castaño’s	 leadership	 of	 the	 nationwide	 umbrella	 group	 for	 the	
autodefensa/paramilitary	 groups,	 the	 AUC,	 when	 he	 claimed	 that	 the	 organisation	 played	 an	
‘important	role	in	keeping	this	nation	from	a	failed	government’	(Wilson	2001;	Aranguen	2001:	261-
263).	 The	 AUC	 thus	 portrayed	 itself	 as	 safe-guarding	 the	 state	 and	 seeking	 to	 ‘re-establish	 its	
functions’	(Rodrigo	Tovar	Pupo	aka	Jorge	40,	quoted	in,	Velásquez	Rivera	2007:	1410).	In	doing	so,	it	
justified	 its	 existence	on	 the	basis	 of	 anti-subversive	 principles,	 by	 aiding	 the	 state	 to	 re-establish	
control	of	its	territory.	This	included	the	military,	which,	according	to	the	leadership	of	AUC	had	‘not	
done	 their	 institutional	 duty	 of	 guaranteeing	 Colombians	 their	 lives,	 property,	 and	 honor	 (sic)’,	
hence	it	fell	to	the	AUC	to	do	‘a	patriotic	duty	that	the	military	did	not	want	or	were	not	able	to	do’	
(Wilson	 2001	 (their	 translation)).	 The	 autodefensas	 were	 thus	 closely	 involved	 with,	 and	 their	
formation	 was	 supported	 by,	 the	 army	 and	 local	 and	 national	 politicians,	 whilst	 simultaneously	
claiming	that	these	had	failed	in	their	duties	(Medina	Gallego	1990:	185,	197-198).	Although	the	field	
of	 contestation	 and	 negotiation	 is	 produced	 differently	 from	 the	 Mexican	 example,	 the	 case	 of	
Colombia	equally	presents	a	set	of	relations	that	is	both	complex	and	dynamic,	in	which	the	state	is	
not	 ‘absent’	 or	 ‘failing’	 but	 part	 of	 a	 field	 in	which	 different	 claims	 to	 legitimacy	 and	 identity	 are	
played	out.	On	 their	 part,	 the	 autodefensas	 deploy	 state	 failure	 as	 a	 politics	 of	 labelling	 to	 justify	
their	(legitimate)	existence,	whilst	simultaneously	working	closely	with	the	state,	and	especially	the	
army	(Medina	Gallego	1990:	170-172,	178-180).		
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For	 instance,	 in	Magdalena	Medio,	 an	 important	 region	 in	 the	 initial	 development	 of	 the	
autodefensas,	and	in	particular	the	town	of	Puerto	Boyacá,	the	army	played	a	direct	role	in	setting	
up	 autodefensas,	 with	 support	 from	 the	 rural	 elite,	 who	 were	 primarily	 wealthy	 landowners	 and	
businessmen,	as	well	as	drug	traffickers.	These	seemingly	disparate	groups	had	a	shared	opposition	
to	 both	 the	 national	 dialogue	 instigated	 by	 President	 Betancur,	 and	 the	 guerrilla	 movements,	
primarily	 in	 the	 form	of	FARC	(Medina	Gallego	1990:	146,	170-172,	178-180;	Romero	2003:	18-18,	
24).	 The	 armed	 forces,	 operating	 under	 a	 national	 security	 doctrine	 premised	 on	 the	 counter-
insurgency	of	the	Cold	War,	felt	betrayed	by	the	dialogue	with	the	guerrillas	instituted	by	Betancur,	
and	 so	 turned	 to	 the	 civilian	population	 for	help	 in	 their	 fight	 against	 FARC.	The	 regional	 elites	of	
Magdalena	 Medio	 also	 saw	 the	 national	 dialogue	 as	 a	 betrayal	 by	 the	 central	 government	 that	
directly	 threatened	their	 interests	by	raising	the	possibility	of	 land	reform.	With	the	growth	of	 the	
narcotics	trade,	drug-traffickers	had	started	buying	land	and	by	the	early	1980s	had	become	major	
landholders	 in	 Magdalena	 Medio.	 Both	 these	 sections	 of	 society	 came	 into	 conflict	 with	 the	
guerrillas	who	became	increasingly	aggressive	in	their	implementation	of	both	land	taxes-	‘vacunas’	
(literally-	 ‘vaccinations’),	 and	 their	 tax	 on	 the	 drug	 trade-	 ‘gramaje’	 (literally-	 ‘weight’)	 (Álvaro	
Rodríguez	2009:	67-68;	Mazzei	2009:	79).	
The	 regional	 elites,	 including	 the	 autodefensas,	 employed	 the	 idea	 of	 state	 failure	 to	
mobilise	 support	 for	 their	 political	 aims	 of	 reversing	 the	 policy	 of	 national	 dialogue	 and	 guarding	
against	rural	reform.	In	this	effort,	they	formed	alliances	with	other	groups	disillusioned	with	these	
policies,	including	state	institutions	such	as	the	armed	forces.	This	seemingly	contradictory	position	
of	 accepting	 help	 from	 parts	 of	 the	 state	whilst	 portraying	 other	 sectors	 of	 it	 as	 failed	 or	 failing,	
illustrates	 the	 idea	 of	 governance	 as	 part	 of	 a	 field	 of	 contestation	 and	 negotiation,	 in	which	 the	
state	is	multi-faceted	and	co-constituted	with	other	groups	in	society,	and	legitimacy	is	continuously	
being	produced,	contested	and	negotiated.		
	
4.	Neoliberalism,	Violence	and	the	Transformation	of	the	State	
The	idea	of	violent	pluralism	helps	to	reconceptualise	the	notions	and	relations	of	violence,	
governance,	 identity	 and	 legitimacy	 in	 the	 context	 of	 autodefensas.	 In	 addition,	 it	 situates	 these	
processes,	and	the	problem	of	violence,	in	relation	to	the	development	of	neoliberalism,	which	has	
reconfigured	 the	 state	 in	 recent	 decades.	 Arias	 and	 Goldstein	 (2010)	 argue	 that	 the	 violence	
experienced	 in	 contemporary	 Latin	 America	 is	 a	 logical	 result	 of	 the	 unfolding	 of	 neoliberal	
democracy.	Therefore,	when	citizens	take	matters	of	justice	into	their	own	hands,	for	example	in	the	
lynchings	of	criminals	in	Bolivia,	this	is	not	a	throwback	to	previous	times,	but	rather	a	response	to	
14	
	
insecurity	 embodied	 in	 neoliberal	 democracy	 in	 which	 individual	 responsibility	 is	 stressed	 rather	
than	 reliance	 on	 the	 state	 (Ibid;	 Goldstein	 2005).	 The	 rise	 of	 autodefensas	 could	 similarly	 be	
understood	as	a	response	to	insecurity	resulting	from	neoliberal	democracy.	
Arias	and	Goldstein	are	not	alone	in	situating	the	challenges	facing	Latin	American	states,	of	
which	 the	 emergence	 of	 autodefensas	 are	 a	 symptom,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 development	 of	
neoliberalism	 in	 the	 region	 from	 the	 1980s	 onwards.	 Part	 of	 this	 development,	 and	 one	 of	 the	
hallmarks	of	neoliberalism	in	Latin	America,	has	been	a	shift	towards	export-led	growth	in	areas	such	
as	 agriculture.	 Yet,	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 agricultural	 export	 economy	has	 not	 led	 to	 benefits	 for	 the	
wider	 community	 and	 inequality,	 poverty	 and	 feelings	 of	 marginalisation	 remain.	 In	 the	 case	 of	
Michoacán,	 the	 capital	 and	 infrastructure	 investments	 required	 to	 support	 the	 cultivation	 and	
exportation	of	agricultural	products,	such	as	limes	and	avocados,	is	a	factor	in	explaining	how	drug	
cartels	 have	 been	 able	 to	 flourish	 in	 the	 region	 (Malkin	 2001).	 For	 example	 the	 port	 of	 Lazaro	
Cardenas	is	a	major	drug	transhipment	point,	both	for	the	import	and	export	of	cocaine	from	Latin	
America	 and	 to	 the	 USA,	 but	 also	 for	 the	 import	 of	 precursor	 chemicals	 for	 the	 fabrication	 of	
methamphetamines.	In	Colombia,	whilst	initially	protecting	land	from	the	guerrillas,	the	potential	for	
expansion	 soon	 became	 apparent	 and	 groups	 of	 autodefensa/paramilitaries	 started	 to	 grow	 and	
develop	 in	 different	 regions	 and	 to	 accumulate	 increasing	 amounts	 of	 land.	The	 land,	 from	which	
local	populations	were	frequently	displaced	using	violence,	could	subsequently	be	sold	to	local	and	
international	 companies	 often	 involved	 in	 monoculture	 agricultural	 production	 geared	 towards	
export	to	foreign	markets.	Corporations	also	used	paramilitary	groups	to	safeguard	their	lands	from	
guerrillas	 and	 to	 discipline	 their	 workforce,	 preventing	 strikes	 and	 muting	 wage	 and	 benefit	
demands.	 For	 instance,	 banana	 companies	 in	 the	 Urabá	 region,	 including	 major	 international	
companies	such	as	Chiquita,	paid	paramilitaries	per	box	of	bananas	for	their	services	(Gentile	2008;	
El	Espectador	2008;	Lobe	&	Muscara	2011).	
	For	Arias	and	Goldstein,	as	for	scholars	like	Morton	and	Wacquant	the	relationship	between	
neoliberalism	and	the	transformation	of	the	state	is	of	key	significance	in	this	context.	In	his	critique	
of	state	failure	approaches,	Morton	argues	that	the	issues	facing	Mexico	are	due	to	transformations	
of	 the	state	 resulting	 from	neo-liberal	 restructuring	 rather	 than	the	 failure	of	 the	state	 to	develop	
properly.	This	was	particularly	felt	in	Mexico	following	the	signing	of	the	North	American	Free	Trade	
Agreement	(NAFTA)	which,	coupled	with	a	reduction	in	state	subsidies,	had	a	significant	 impact	on	
the	competitiveness	of	the	agricultural	produce	of	Michoacán	(Aguiar	2012:	166-167;	Cavanagh	et	al	
2002:	58-65).	The	 impacts	of	 this	 transformation	of	 the	state,	socially	and	territorially	 (Maldonado	
Aranda	 2013:	 46),	 are	 key	 to	 understanding	 how	 and	 why	 autodefensas	 have	 emerged.	 Morton	
(2012:	1641)	argues	that	neoliberal	policies	have	stimulated	the	growth	of	both	the	drugs	 industry	
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and	levels	of	money	laundering	in	Mexico,	whilst	the	pretext	of	the	war	on	drugs	helped	to	protect	
NAFTA.		
Loïc	Wacquant	 (2008;	 2009)	 stresses	 that	 neoliberalism	 is	 driven	 less	 by	 the	 market	 and	
more	by	the	construction	of	a	particular	type	of	state.	The	state	is	increasingly	reliant	on	its	punitive	
and	coercive	branches	to	shore	up	its	 legitimacy	in	the	face	of	a	reduction	in	its	provision	of	social	
services	and	welfare	to	 its	populations.	For	 instance,	Mexican	state	 interventions,	beginning	under	
Calderón,	were	characterised	by	the	mass	deployment	of	the	Army,	Federal	Police	and	Navy.	Indeed,	
the	Federal	response	to	the	autodefensa	groups,	when	 it	eventually	came,	was	the	deployment	of	
further	troops.	Whilst	this	was	accompanied	by	promises	of	funds	to	rebuild	the	social	fabric	of	the	
region,	 such	 programmes	 were	 quickly	 decommissioned	 whilst	 the	 troops	 often	 remained.	
Wacquant	(2007)	argues	that	these	interventions	are	characterised	by	territorial	stigmatisation	and	
labelling	of	certain	areas	as	violent,	 lawless	and	as	‘black	holes’,	which	enables	them	to	be	treated	
differently.	For	 instance,	areas	such	as	the	Tierra	Caliente	region	have	been	portrayed	as	a	 lawless	
and	violent	area,	characterised	by	a	violent	population	and	hostile	terrain	(Maldonado	2012).	
In	 Colombia,	 President	 Alvaro	 Uribe’s	 Democratic	 Security	 Policy	 consisted	 of	 a	
confrontational	stance	towards	the	FARC	guerrillas,	involving	the	use	of	the	Army	to	push	into	areas	
previously	controlled	by	such	groups.	The	effort	to	establish	state	presence	in	these	areas	bore	out	
much	 of	 the	 criticisms	 autodefensa/paramilitary	 groups	 had	 levelled	 against	 the	 state,	 as	 it	 was	
present	primarily	through	its	coercive	arms,	the	Police	and	the	Army.	In	the	case	of	the	‘Push	to	the	
South’6,	this	involved	the	support	of	paramilitary	forces,	which	were	transported	in	from	other	parts	
of	 the	 country	 by	 the	 Army	 to	 assist	 in	 the	 offensive.	 In	 this	 case,	 too,	 the	 production	 of	 a	
(legitimate)	presence	through	violent	governance	involves	a	blurring	of	the	distinction	between	state	
and	non-state.	As	the	presence	of	the	state	was	limited	to	the	Army	and	Police,	it	could	co-exist	with	
the	violent	governance	of	paramilitary	groups	and	helped	 spread	 the	neoliberal	 transformation	of	
the	state	to	other	areas	(see	for	example	Rodríguez	González	2014).	These	examples	illustrate	that	
(violent)	 governance	 produces	 and	 operates	 as	 a	 field	 of	 contestation	 and	 negotiation,	 whereby	
various	 groups	 challenge	 the	 legitimacy	 and	 identity	 of	 other	 groups	 whilst	 simultaneously	 being	
implicated	 in	and	supporting	 it	 in	other	ways.	This	has	 led	scholars	 such	as	Civico	 (2015),	 to	claim	
that	far	from	being	a	sign	of	state	weakness,	and	despite	their	rhetoric	of	state	failure,	such	groups	
can	 in	 some	 way	 be	 seen	 to	 strengthen	 the	 state,	 albeit	 in	 a	 perverse	 form	 conditioned	 by	 its	
neoliberal	nature	and	insertion	into	the	world	economy.					
However,	 these	 developments	 –	 the	 entwinement	 of	 (non-)state	 groups;	 the	 state’s	
attempts	at	delegitimising	and	stigmatising	certain	groups	and	 regions;	and,	 the	perception	of	 the	
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state’s	violent	interventions	as	creating	further	violence	–	are	not	new	and	have	a	long	history.	It	is	
therefore	too	simplistic	to	attribute	all	such	developments	to	the	advent	of	neoliberalism.	Rather,	as	
Arias	and	Goldstein	suggest,	these	underlying	issues	and	conflicts	have	been	aggravated	and	brought	
to	 greater	 prominence	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 neoliberal	 policies,	 which	 have	 exacerbated	 pre-
existing	problems	and	created	 feelings	of	abandonment.	Therefore,	 the	 rhetorical	portrayal	of	 the	
state	 as	 failed	 by	 the	 autodefensas	 can	 be	 better	 understood	 as	 voicing	 people’s	 long-held	
perception	of	being	abandoned	by	the	state	and	being	side-lined	by	the	national	project	(e.g.	Malkin	
2001).	 The	 cartel	 and	 the	 autodefensas,	 have	 utilised	 such	 ideas	 to	 gain	 legitimacy	 for	 their	
alternative	governance,	and	indeed	their	very	presence	as	sources	of	governance	reflect	the	ways	in	
which	 the	 state	 and	 state-society	 relations	 have	 changed	 under	 neoliberalism.	 Therefore,	 despite	
the	 very	 real	 presence	 of	 the	 state	 –	 especially	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 coercive	 branches	 –	 and	 the	
investments	 in	 infrastructure	 that	 has	 been	 made,	 because	 of	 the	 purposes	 for	 which	 such	
interventions	are	 carried	out,	 and	 the	manner	 in	which	 they	are	undertaken,	 the	population	does	
not	feel	that	the	state	is	present	in	the	ways	in	which	they	want	it	to	be	so.		
	
5.	(Non)violent	(dis)ordering	
The	 notion	 of	 violent	 pluralism	 helps	 to	 contextualise	 the	 role	 of	 neoliberalism	 in	 the	
development	 of	 relations	 among	 and	 transformations	 of	 (non)state	 groups	 in	 Latin	 America.	 In	
addition,	 and	 relatedly,	 it	 enables	 a	 conceptualisation	of	politics	 in	 terms	of	 (violent)	 struggle	and	
conflict	 (Arias	 and	 Goldstein	 2010:	 15).	 We	 have	 developed	 these	 insights	 into	 the	 idea	 of	
governance	as	a	field	of	contestation	and	negotiation	whereby	different	groups	produce,	challenge,	
contest,	enable	and	negotiate	 legitimacy	and	 identity	 through	violent	means.	As	 illustrated	by	 the	
autodefensas	 in	Mexico	 and	 Colombia,	 violence	 can	 bring	 into	 question	 existing	 social	 norms	 and	
enable	the	formation	of	political	order	and	of	new	modes	of	political	subjectivity	(Ibid:	23-24).		
We	will	develop	these	 insights	 in	 two	directions.	Firstly,	whilst	violence	 is	often	associated	
with	 disorder,	 the	 case	 of	 autodefensas	 shows	 is	 also	 constitutive	 of	 forms	 of	 order(ing).	We	will	
push	 this	 idea	 further	 by	 suggesting	 that	 the	 relationship	 violence-governance-legitimacy	 is	
characterised	by	 the	 simultaneity	 and	 inextricability	 of	 ordering	 and	disordering	 (Ansems	de	Vries	
2014).	 Secondly,	 and	 following	 this,	 conceiving	 of	 governance	 as	 a	 field	 of	 contestation	 and	
negotiation	constituted	by	a	play	of	(dis)ordering	also	raises	the	question	of	the	role	of	non-violence,	
and	the	relationship	between	violence	and	non-violence.	We	argue	that,	in	this	field,	(dis)order	and	
(non)violence	are	continuously	produced	and	reproduced	and	become	difficult	to	tell	apart.		
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In	 other	 words,	 whilst	 we	 argue	 that	 violence	 is	 highly	 significant	 in	 the	 autodefensas’	
production	of	 legitimacy	and	 identity,	 these	processes	 cannot	be	 reduced	 to	 violence	alone.	Arias	
and	 Goldstein’s	 writing	 underemphasises	 the	 idea	 that	 non-violence,	 intricately	 entangled	 with	
violent	 practices,	 plays	 a	 constitutive	 role	 as	 well.	 For	 example,	 in	 Colombia	 groups	 such	 as	
ACDEGAM	(Asociación	Campesina	de	Ganaderos	y	Agricultores	del	Magdalena	Medio)	were	set-up	
by	key	supporters	of	the	autodefensas	in	the	Magdalena	Medio	region,	drawn	from	the	land	owning	
elites	who	had	a	vested	interest	in	countering	the	threat	that	the	guerrilla	groups	faced.	Such	groups	
were	utilised	 to	 lobby	 the	 local	and	national	governments	as	well	as	 to	drum	up	support	amongst	
the	local	populace.	Therefore,	violence	was	used	to	help	construct	an	identity	for	the	autodefensas	
and	define	 their	 constituency,	but	 their	 supporters	also	 tried	 to	build	 links	 to	 civil	 society	and	 the	
different	 levels	 of	 the	 state.	 Thus,	 paramilitary	 and	 autodefensa	 groups	made	widespread	 use	 of	
‘spectacular’	violence	such	as	massacres	and	the	limpieza	social	but	they	also	developed	other	forms	
of	violent	and	nonviolent	governance,	for	instance	through	the	provision	of	a	form	of	alternative	law	
and	order	in	the	communities	they	controlled.	This	involved	both	the	killing	of	thieves	and	members	
of	 gangs	 and	 a	 graduated	 system	 of	 punishments	 and	 the	 arbitration	 of	 social	 behaviour	 (Civico	
2015).	 For	 example,	 husbands	who	 beat	wives	 or	members	 of	 gangs	would	 be	 given	warnings	 to	
change	their	behaviour	or	face	more	serious	consequences	(Caraballo	Acuña	2010).		
Sanford	(2004)	notes	that	towns	controlled	by	such	groups	experienced	close	to	no	crime	of	
the	common	or	garden	sort.	Whilst	this	does	not	mitigate	the	violence	these	groups	committed,	in	
particular	when	 they	 first	 took	 over	 towns,	 it	 does	 help	 to	 explain	how	 they	 gained	 legitimacy	 as	
some	Colombians	saw	them	as	providing	a	form	of	order	(Civico	2015).	Other	non-violent	practices	
that	helped	to	produce	legitimacy	consisted	in	the	provision	of	social	goods	to	communities,	which	is	
especially	 significant	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 neo-liberal	 reforms	 discussed	 above.	 This	 included	 the	
provision	of	services,	 investment	 in	 infrastructure	and	the	construction	of	public	buildings,	such	as	
the	 school	 financed	by	 Fidel	 Castaño	 in	Magdalena	Medio	 (Dudley	 2004).	 Violent	 and	non-violent	
practices	of	governance	are	thus	closely	entwined	and	whilst	the	extent	of	the	latter	may	well	have	
been	overstated	by	paramilitary	leaders	in	their	testimonies,	the	wide	range	of	scholars	referring	to	
such	 non-violent	 practices	 (e.g.	 Lara	 2000;	 Civico	 2015;	 Aranguen	 2001;	 Romero	 2003;	 Medina	
Gallego	1990;	Dudley	2004;	Caraballo	Acuña	2010)	suggest	their	significance	as	part	of	paramilitary	
and	 autodefensa	 practices	 of	 governance.	 Autodefensas	 thus	 challenged	 the	 state	 (and	 other	
groups)	 in	 some	ways,	 co-operated	with	 them	 in	other	ways,	 and	 took	on	 state-like	 activities	 and	
appearances	through	both	violent	and	non-violent	practices,	or	indeed	through	the	blurring	of	these.	
These	practices	of	(non)violence	thus	had	both	ordering	and	disordering	effects.		
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In	Mexico,	various	groups	employed	culture	and	religion	in	the	production,	contestation	and	
negotiation	of	legitimacy	and	identity.	This	plays	out,	for	instance,	with	respect	to	the	contestation	
between	 the	 Knights	 Templar	 cartel	 and	 the	 autodefensas	 over	 their	 respective	 Michoacán	
identities.	 The	 Knights	 Templar	 cartel	 and	 their	 predecessor,	 La	 Familia	Michoacana,	 had	 strongly	
emphasised	 this	 identity,	 claiming	 to	 protect	 the	 local	 citizenry	 against	 the	 barbarity	 of	 ‘foreign’	
cartels	 from	other	 states,	whereby	 the	autodefensas	were	portrayed	as	 stooges	of	 these	 ‘foreign’	
cartels.	 The	 autodefensas	 contested	 these	 claims	 by	 presenting	 themselves	 as	 a	 popular	 social	
movement	 comprised	 of	 ordinary	 local	 people	 (Le	 Cour	 Grandmaison	 2014:	 7;	 Prados	 2013).	 The	
autodefensas	 employed	 non-violent	 –	 or	 violent	 non-violent	 –	 methods	 to	 reinforce	 their	 local	
identity	whilst	directly	challenging	the	cartel’s	methods	of	attracting	and	cementing	social	support.	
In	particular,	they	used	corridos	(traditional	ballads	from	rural	Mexico	used	to	tell	stories	set	to	folk	
music)	to	recount	their	struggles	and	exploits.	These	mirrored	the	cartels’	narco-corridos,	which	are	
the	 same	 kind	 of	 ballads,	 extensively	 exploited	 by	 the	 cartels	 to	 commemorate	 their	 actions	 and	
attract	 social	 support7	 (McGirk	 2010).	 Here,	 music	 operates	 as	 a	 field	 of	 contestation:	 song	 is	
employed	 in	 a	battle	 for	both	 territory	and	 identity,	 blurring	 the	 lines	between	violence	and	non-
violence	as	non-violent	means	are	utilised	to	support,	justify	and	commemorate	violent	acts.		
This	(non)violent	employment	of	identity	is	also	visible	with	respect	to	religion.	Importantly,	
La	 Familia	Michoacana	had	portrayed	 themselves	 as	 a	 quasi-religious	 sect	which	promoted	 family	
values	 and	 whose	 members	 were	 teetotal.	 The	 Knights	 Templar	 continued	 this	 trend,	 and	 also	
portrayed	its	leaders	such	as	‘El	Chayo’	(Nazario	Moreno	González	–	also	a	key	leader	of	La	Familia	
Michoacana)	as	 religious	 figures.	 In	 response	 to	 this	 the	autodefensas	demonstrated	 their	 links	 to	
established	 church	 figures	 who	 spoke	 in	 support	 of	 the	 autodefensas	 such	 as	 Father	 Patricio	
Madrigal8,	priest	of	Nueva	 Italia,	Miguel	Patiño	Velásquez,	 the	Bishop	of	Apatzingan,	and	José	Luis	
Suárez	Barragán,	priest	of	La	Ruana	(Calderón	2014;	Chouza	2013;	Prados	2013).	By	emphasising	this	
link	to	the	established	church	the	autodefensas	sought	to	 legitimate	themselves	 in	the	eyes	of	the	
public,	whilst	challenging	the	Knights	Templar’s	supposed	religious	credentials.	This	was	particularly	
important	because	the	Church	was	regarded	as	the	only	institution	in	the	region	that	had	not	been	
infiltrated	and	corrupted	by	the	Knights	Templar.		
The	co-operation	between	members	of	 the	church	and	the	autodefensas	 is	also	 illustrated	
by	their	joint	announcement	of	a	civil	society	movement	called	“Yo	soy	autodefensa”.	This	group	had	
the	 objective	 of	 calling	 for	 the	 imposition	 of	 security	 and	 the	 law	 across	 Mexico,	 and	 was	
characterised	 as	 an	 unarmed	 social	 movement	 by	 its	 founders	 (Chouza	 2014).	 The	 “Yo	 soy	
autodefensas”	 movement	 provides	 an	 interesting	 meeting	 point	 between	 the	 autodefensas’	
construction	 of	 the	 state	 as	 having	 failed,	 and	 its	 identity	 as	 a	 violent	 actor	 pursuing	 non-violent	
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means,	 in	 league	with	the	local	church,	to	secure	its	position	and	negotiate	with	the	Federal	state.	
Here,	 too,	 violence	 and	 non-violence	 are	 intricately	 linked	 in	 the	 constitution	 of	 legitimacy	 and	
identity.	 Moreover,	 as	 in	 previous	 examples,	 socio-political	 (dis)order,	 legitimacy	 and	 political	
identity	 are	 continuously	 produced,	 negotiated	 and	 contested,	 rather	 than	 a	 state	 that	 can	 be	
achieved	once	and	for	all.		
Governance	 and	 legitimacy	 thus	 continue	 to	 operate	 in	 a	 field	 of	 contestation	 and	
negotiation	 –	 and	 a	 process	 of	 ordering	 and	 disordering	 simultaneously	 –	 despite	 the	 state’s	
attempts	 at	 gaining	 a	 monopoly	 of	 legitimate	 control.	 Given	 the	 control	 of	 some	 areas	 by	 the	
autodefensas,	 and	 the	 failure	 of	 initial	 attempts	 at	 disarmament,	 the	 state’s	 engagement	 with	
autodefensas	 were	 marked	 by	 co-operation	 and	 contestation	 simultaneously.	 Collaboration	 was	
enabled	by	the	perception	of	the	cartel	as	a	shared	enemy	(at	least	to	some	extent)	and	the	fact	that	
the	autodefensas	had	not	positioned	 themselves	directly	against	 the	state.	Yet,	 such	collaboration	
also	 undermined	 the	 state’s	 legitimacy	 by	 working	 with	 an	 ‘illegal’	 armed	 group.	 The	 state’s	
perceived	 need	 to	 position	 itself	 ‘against’	 a	 particular	 group	 in	 order	 to	 reinforce	 the	 distinction	
between	 the	 ‘legal’	 and	 ‘illegal’,	 the	 ‘legitimate’	 and	 the	 ‘illegitimate’,	 and	 state	 and	 non-state,	
shows	 the	 continued	 importance	of	 producing	 such	binaries	 in	 societal	 imaginings	 even	when	 the	
situation	 is	 acknowledged	 to	 be	more	 complex.	 Thus,	whilst	 the	 case	 of	 autodefensas	 shows	 that	
socio-political	 order(ing)	 is	 produced	 through	 complex	 processes	 of	 contestation,	 disruption,	
negotiation	and	collaboration	simultaneously,	in	which	the	distinctions	between	(il)legal,	(non)state,	
(il)legitimate	and	(non)violence	blur,	we	argue	that	 it	also	shows	that	such	distinctions	continue	to	
be	important	with	respect	to	the	production	of	legitimacy	and	identity	by	various	groups.		
From	 May	 2014,	 the	 Mexican	 state	 sought	 to	 institutionalise	 the	 autodefensa	 groups	
through	their	inclusion	in	the	Fuerza	Rural	(Rural	Defence	Force)	and	criminalise	those	who	refused	
to	 either	 demobilise	 or	 join	 the	 Fuerza	 Rural,	 such	 as	 those	 led	 by	 Dr	Mireles	 who	 had	 become	
increasingly	 critical	 of	 the	 state	 intervention.	Here,	 too,	 the	distinction	between	 the	 legal	 and	 the	
illegal	 is	 reinforced	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 control	 over	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 many	 lines	 have	 become	
blurred.	Yet,	the	fact	that	these	 lines	remained	blurred	and	shifting	 in	practice	 is	 illustrated	by	the	
process	 of	 institutionalisation,	which	 consisted	of	 simply	 swapping	weapons	 for	 state	 issued	 rifles	
and	being	 given	official	 uniforms	 and	 vehicles	 etc.,	 rather	 than	displacing	 the	 regimes	 of	 (violent)	
governance	the	autodefensas	had	in	place.	Whilst	an	effort	to	be	seen	as	the	only	legitimate	armed	
actor,	 the	 state’s	 institutionalisation	of	 another	 armed	 group	helped	 to	 legitimise	 the	 control	 and	
(violent)	governance	of	the	autodefensas	more	than	undermine	it.				
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6.	Conclusion	
The	 autodefensas	 of	 Michoacán	 and	 Colombia	 have	 been	 officially	 disbanded	 and/or	
institutionalised,	 yet	 the	 issues	 that	 provoked	 their	 emergence,	 their	 actual	 presence,	 and	 (the	
effects	 of)	 their	 practices	 of	 violent	 governance	 have	 not	 gone	 away.	 In	 Michoacán,	 some	
autodefensas	 have	 continued	 to	 operate	whilst	 others	 periodically	 threaten	 to	 remobilise,	 stating	
that	 the	problems	of	 insecurity	 remain	unchanged.	 Likewise,	 in	Colombia	 the	peace	deal	between	
the	Colombian	government	and	FARC	has	brought	about	a	renewed	focus	on	paramilitarism	and	the	
‘bandas	criminales’	(ICG	2007)	that	still	operate	and	indeed	are	highly	active,	targeting	social,	human	
rights	and	land	reconstitution	leaders	with	renewed	vigour.			
Through	the	employment,	critique	and	enrichment	of	the	notions	of	state	failure	and	violent	
pluralism	we	have	developed	four	points	regarding	the	relationship	between	violence,	governance,	
legitimacy	and	identity	 in	the	context	of	autodefensas	 in	Mexico	and	Colombia.	Firstly,	rather	than	
evaluating	in	which	ways	the	existence	of	autodefensas	can	be	seen	as	an	expression	of	state	failure,	
and	 rather	 than	merely	developing	a	 critique	of	 state	 failure	 literature,	we	have	 shown	 that	 state	
failure	 is	 not	 merely	 a	 problematic	 ‘external’	 (Western)	 imposition	 leading	 to	 various	 forms	 of	
intervention,	 but	 also	 a	 strategic	 means	 of	 making	 claims	 by	 ‘internal’	 groups.	 The	 autodefensas	
have	skilfully	appropriated	the	notion	of	state	failure	that	functioned	to	delegitimise	the	context	in	
which	they	operated,	turning	it	on	its	head	to	legitimise	their	actions.	We	have	developed	the	notion	
of	a	 field	of	contestation	and	negotiation	to	show	how	different	groups	make	claims	and	counter-
claims	to	both	failure	and	legitimacy.	This	field	of	contestation	and	negotiation	is	thus	constituted	by	
a	 range	 of	 practices	 of	 (non)violent	 governance	 and	 a	 range	 of	 (non)state	 groups	 –	 blurring	 the	
distinctions	between	the	two	–	and	productive	of	political	order(ing)	and	identities.	Moreover,	 it	 is	
not	 merely	 a	 matter	 of	 material	 and/or	 territorial	 practices	 but	 also	 encompasses	 discursive	
relations	 of	 power/knowledge,	 such	 as	 the	 ability	 to	make	 a	 claim	 that	 provokes	 a	 reaction	 that	
helps	to	legitimise	it.		
Secondly,	 we	 have	 employed	 the	 notion	 of	 violent	 pluralism,	 which	 enables	 a	
conceptualisation	of	politics	as	a	field	of	struggle	constitutive	of	political	order(ing)	and	identity,	to	
make	 sense	 of	 the	 violent	 legitimisation	 of	 practices	 and	 identities	 in	 a	 way	 that	 challenges	 the	
linking	of	state	and	legitimacy,	and	violence	and	disorder.	Rather	than	a	state	that	can	be	achieved,	
legitimacy	 is	understood	as	a	continuous	process	of	production,	contestation	and	negotiation,	part	
of	 a	 broader	 field	 of	 contestation	 and	 negotiation	 that	 includes	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 practices	 of	
governance.	Violence,	as	a	form	of	governance	employed	to	produce	legitimacy,	has	effects	of	both	
ordering	 and	 disordering:	 it	might	 establish	 control	 over	 a	 territory,	 challenge	 extant	 governance	
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practices,	create	trust	and/or	distrust	among	the	local	population,	disrupt	and/or	establish	practices	
of	 extortion,	 etc.	 In	 addition,	 the	 notion	 of	 violent	 pluralism	 helps	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 role	 of	
neoliberal	 restructuring	 in	 the	 functioning	 and	 identity	 of	 the	 state,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
violent	practices	of	governance	and	claims	to	legitimacy	by	other	groups	such	as	autodefensas,	but	
also	with	respect	to	the	entanglement	of	state	and	non-state	groups.	As	we	have	shown,	neoliberal	
restructuring	is	not	synonymous	with	the	absence	of	the	state	per	se,	however,	the	employment	of	
failed	 state	 discourse	 by	 autodefensas	 suggests	 that	 feelings	 of	 abandonment	 and	 ambivalence	
towards	state	presence	have	provided	a	fertile	ground	for	such	claims.		
Thirdly,	 we	 have	 pointed	 out	 that,	 despite	 its	 value	 for	 understanding	 the	 complexity	 of	
relations	at	play,	 the	concept	of	violent	pluralism	under-emphasises	non-violent	practices	and	fails	
to	address	 the	relationship	between	violence	and	non-violence.	The	 idea	of	a	 field	of	contestation	
and	 negotiation	 does	 enable	 an	 examination	 of	 these	 relationships,	 showing	 the	 inextricability	 of	
violence	and	non-violence	 in	the	context	of	autodefensas.	Whilst	violence	 is	central	to	practices	of	
governance	on	behalf	of	autodefensas,	these	groups	also	engage	in	less	violent	practices,	 including	
the	formation	of	civil	society	organisations	and	engagement	 in	cultural	and	religious	traditions	and	
performances,	 in	their	efforts	to	construct,	contest	and	negotiate	their	 legitimacy	and	 identity.	Or,	
indeed,	given	the	simultaneity	and	co-constitution	of	these	processes,	practices	of	violence	and	non-
violence	 become	 blurred	 and	 difficult	 to	 tell	 apart.	 This	 raises	 an	 important	 and	 underexplored	
question:	 If	 the	 threat	 and	 deployment	 of	 violence	 seem	 so	 pervasive,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 in	 relations	
between	 autodefensas	 and	 other	 groups,	 what	 kinds	 of	 practices	 and	 discourse	 can	 still	 be	
understood	as	truly	non-violent?	The	present	article	has	begun	to	address	this	issue,	yet	it	requires	
further	exploration.		
Finally,	 in	 addition	 to	 challenging	 the	 (binary)	 distinction	 between	 violence	 and	 non-
violence,	the	article	has	called	into	question	a	number	of	other	binaries.	Indeed,	our	examination	of	
the	 production	 and	 contestation	 of	 legitimacy	 and	 identity	 through	 (violent)	 governance	 in	 the	
context	of	autodefensas	has	shown	that	political	order(ing)	is	produced	through	complex	processes	
of	contestation,	disruption,	negotiation	and	collaboration	simultaneously,	 in	which	the	distinctions	
between	 (il)legal,	 (non)state,	 (il)legitimate	 and	 (non)violence	 blur	 and	 transform.	 However,	 this	 is	
not	a	call	for	dismissal	of	these	binaries	as	irrelevant,	rather	we	argue	that	the	binary	and	complex	
are	co-constitutive.	In	the	context	of	autodefensas,	binary	distinctions	continue	to	be	employed	by	a	
range	of	 groups	 in	 their	 discursive	 and	material	 efforts	 to	produce,	 justify,	 challenge,	 contest	 and	
negotiate	their	own	and	others’	legitimacy	and	identity.		
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